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This paper uses the information on 648 manufacturers during the period included between 
1895 and 1993 to explore the interaction of different levels of analysis in developing of the 
United Kingdom motorcycle industry. It provides three general results. First, it demonstrates 
how  long  term  changes  of  the  organizational  environment  can  be  related  to  the  micro-
evolution  of  firms’  strategies.  Second,  it  sheds  light  on  the  fact  that  organizations  and 
population act in the opposite way in determining the survival of firms. On the one hand, 
organizations diversify their production in order to obtain economic advantages of scale and 
superior  profits.  On  the  other,  the  evolution  of  the  population  constrains  organizational 
expansion by increasing the level of competition. These two contrasting forces drive the co-
evolution of niches of generalist and specialist producers within the population. Third, while 
the increasing age of a population’s members tend to reduce the level of competition, ages’ 
heterogeneity represents a powerful selective force acting within an organizational population. 
The  implications  stemming  from  this  work  are  related  to  both  the  literatures  of  business 
strategy and of population ecology. 
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Introduction 
Organizational ecology offers us a powerful tool to interpret the evolutionary 
trajectories of industries. The density-dependence theory (Hannan, 1986) maintains 
that  two counterbalancing  processes  of legitimation and competition influence  the 
evolution of organizational populations. While an impressive array of evidence has 
been  produced  in  support  of  this  theory  (for  a  comprehensive  review  see  Baum, 
1996), several questions were raised on the underlying assumptions of this model. On 
the  one  hand,  with  respect  to  legitimation  –  i.e.  the  process  that  allows  an 
organizational  form  to  become  taken-for-granted  –  Baum  and  Powell  (1995) 
remarked the need for considering the multi-facet nature of this concept. Similarly, 
Singh (1993) suggested that a sensible improvement could be reached though a more 
precise and realistic measurement of it. More recently, Hedstrom, Sandell and Stern 
(2000)  have  proposed  a  new  perspective  to  the  problem,  which  accounts  for 
networking  effects.  On  the  other,  different  emerging  streams  of  research  have 
challenged  the  ecological  representation  of  competition.  The  theory  of  mass-
dependence  (Winter,  1990),  for  instance,  recognizes  that  organizations  do  not 
compete equally, but they generate an amount of competition proportional to their 
size. By the same token, the theory of size-localized competition (Baum and Mezias, 
1992) claims that organizations compete most intensely with those of similar size. In 
a  few  words,  ecologists  have  been  accused  (i)  to  consider  the  organizational 
environment as an exogenous force, and (ii) to consider organizations as homogenous 
competitors. Last (iii), it is not always clear the contribution of this stream of research 
for managerial issues.    
In this work I propose a new way of overcoming these limits, replacing the 
density variable with a new one related to market/firm development – i.e. products’ 
diversity
2  –,  which  mediates  the  cooperative  and  competitive  processes  among 
organizations. I chose this measure because it allows me endogenously investigating 
the development of an organizational population, to map the interactions between 
firms and population in heterogeneous ways, as well as to provide practitioners with 
                                                
2 The term product diversity is used in this paper in the same way of Lancaster (1990: 189), as 
the “number of variants within a specific group of product.”     3 
normative implications. Moreover, tracing the evolution of products’ heterogeneity at 
multiple levels of analysis enables me to acknowledge organization and population as 
mutually related levels of analysis. The organizations differentiate their production in 
order to obtain superior profits. Yet, doing so they directly mold the evolution of the 
product’s heterogeneity at the population level, which in turn, sets the amount of 
cooperation/competition the organization faces in the environment.  
To  reach  this  goal,  I  summarize  the  findings  of  the  literature  on  product 
differentiation, population development, and mutual forbearance to provide evidence 
on how long-term changes of the organizational environment can be related to the 
microevolution of firms’ policies. In particular, I use the information collected on the 
history of 648 British motorcycle manufacturers during the period included between 
1895  and  1993  to  provide  evidence  on  how  product,  market  diversity  and  their 
interaction influence organizational survival. The paper will proceed as follows. In 
the  next  section,  the  theory  will  be  introduced.  Later  on,  the  evolution  of  the 
motorcycle industry will be presented. Then data, model, and method used for the 
analysis will be illustrated. In the last two sections, the results and their normative 
implications will be discussed.   
 
Theory 
  Organizations continuously face a trade-off between efficiency and efficacy. 
Porter (1980) analyzed this problem in terms of the relative advantages of pursuing a 
broad range versus a focused strategy. Typically, a generalist firm is a broad range 
competitor – e.g. Honda, whereas a focused policy implies a narrow range of products 
offering  –  e.g.  Harley  Davidson.  How  many  products  should  a  firm  offer?  The 
problem of assessing the mutual effects of different policy choices within a firm’s 
strategy arose as soon as the idea of strategy as a series of relatively independent 
decisions, typical of the neoclassical economic literature, was questioned. Within the 
bounded  rationality  framework,  several  authors  (Simon,  1947;  Cyert  and  March, 
1963; Thompson, 1967; Nelson and Winter, 1982) developed the concept of strategy 
as  a  self-constraining  process  where  the  payoff  is  determined  by  the  mutual 
dependence of policy choices. The classical strategic analysis builds on the idea that   4 
firms grow, expand and increase their profitability (Chandler, 1962). Product variety 
allows the firm to meet the demand of different groups of consumers and, potentially, 
it increases a firm’s sales. Kekre and Srinivasan (1990) found a positive relationship 
between product line breadth and market share. Indeed, product proliferation can act 
as a deterrent to entry. Schmalensee (1978), for instance, discussed this issue in the 
United States ready-to-eat breakfast cereal industry. He argued that if firms ‘pack’ the 
market with a variety of products or brands so that insufficient room exists for a new 
firm’s product, they might be able to have high prices and profits without attracting 
entries. Last, a multiple product strategy allows also organizations to cope with the 
patterns of products’ life cycle (Cox, 1967). 
  Yet, as the variety of tasks increases, coordination becomes more problematic 
(Lawrence  and  Lorsch,  1967).  Interdependencies  create  uncertainty  that  render 
rational decision-making difficult or even impossible (March and Simon, 1958). As 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978: 40) noted, “interdependency is the reason why nothing 
comes out  quite the way one wants  it to.”  For  these  reasons  a basic principle of 
organizational design is to structure it in order to control the uncertainty created by 
interdependencies (Thompson, 1967). The NK model proposed by Kauffman (1993) 
has widely been used to investigate this issue. Levinthal (1997) found that the level of 
interconnections between the policy choices of a firm’s strategy represent one of the 
main determinants of its outcome. In general, offering multiple products is supposed 
to require a complex firm’s design, to increase organizational interdependencies, and 
to increase inventory costs.  
  On  an  empirical  standpoint,  Barnett  and  Freeman  (1997)  found  that 
coordination’s uncertainty increase  with  the number of products  introduced  by  an 
organization.  More  recently,  Dobrev  and  his  colleagues  proposed  results  that 
implicitly point to a similar direction. Kim, Dobrev and Solari (2001), studying the 
Italian automobile industry, did not support the negative linear relationship between 
niche width and  organizational  mortality.  In  a similar research  on  the automobile 
industry in Great Britain, Germany  and  France, Dobrev, Kim and Hannan (2001) 
found  support  for  the  negative  relationship  only  for  Great  Britain  in  their  most 
complete model formulation (Table 6: 1328).    5 
  In the literature on business strategy, Prahalad and Hamel (1990) suggested 
that  a firm should  enter those  businesses  where its competencies can  be properly 
exploited. Managing a broad range of products implies to properly use the marketing 
tools – i.e. advertising and distribution – as well as to create products that satisfy the 
very diverse needs of multiple groups of customers. Indeed, the latter represents a 
powerful force that can act against the expansion of the range of products of the firm. 
The history of the motorcycle, for instance, demonstrates how difficult this effort can 
be.  At  the  end  of  the  Sixties,  because  of  the  growth  of  the  demand  for  small 
motorcycles, Harley Davidson, the world famous big capacity producers, began to 
commercialize medium capacity motorcycles – 125 and 250 cc. This strategy soon 
encountered major losses: traditional clients became unidentified with the brand and 
the market share of the firm declined. Within a few years, Harley Davidson returned 
to its traditional production (Grant, 1991). Therefore, I hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 1: There is a È-shaped relationship between  
the diversity of products a firm offers and its rate of failure. 
 
  Diversity  assumes  also  a  systemic  level  connotation.  At  industry-level  of 
analysis for instance, diversity plays a central role in several fields. Social diversity 
and pluralism, for instance, are widely held to foster institutional and technological 
innovation (Mokyr, 1994). Economists (Nelson and Winter, 1977) and biologists (i.e. 
Pielou,  1977)  have  underlined  the  importance  of  variation  as  a  chief  cause  of 
evolution (Marshall, 1961). On a technological standpoint, Saviotti and Mani (1995: 
390)  argued  that  technological  diversity  is  “a  necessary  requirement  for  the 
continuation of long term development.” In a similar vein, Kauffman (1993) noted 
that growth of cities appears to be strongly correlated with industrial diversity and not 
with  concentration  within  a  single  industry.  Last,  the  rate  of  evolution  displayed 
within a particular industry tends to be proportional to the degree of economic variety 
contained within it (Gibbons and Metcalfe, 1986).  
  Diversity represents also an important feature of resilient systems. As Hannan 
and  Freeman  (1989:  3)  stated,  “the  ability  of  a  society  as  a  whole  to  respond  to   6 
changing conditions depends on the responsiveness of its constituent organizations 
and on the diversity of its organizational populations.” Organizational diversity sets 
the limit on the range of alternative solutions that are available in the environment. 
Similarly, Grabher and Stark (1997) suggested that diversity plays an important role 
in promoting the adaptability of a system. Their analysis of the regional determinants 
of successful entrepreneurship in Northern Italy and Eastern Europe confirmed that 
diversity  is  an important factor  in promoting  adaptability in  an  economy. Indeed, 
diversity can help to reduce lock-in consequences. Increasing returns from learning 
effects yield immediate benefits, but prevent the system to choose the most efficient 
solution (Carroll and Harrison, 1994). Diversity mitigates these negative effects by 
rising  the  competition  among  solutions.  Thus,  diversity  is  seen  to  promote  the 
ecological  competition  among firms  and  to drive,  at the  system-level  of  analysis, 
economic evolution. 
  Durkheim, (1897) argued that the division of work represents the byproduct 
of  economic  evolution.  Yet,  fragmented  systems  –  i.e.  highly  diversified  ones  - 
usually under-exploit many resources. Diversity in fact is not a free good. In the case 
of technology for instance, standardization is important to bring scale advantages and 
network  externalities,  usually  associated  with  increasing  system-level  learning. 
Indeed, “in many contexts, organizational diversity likely influences outcomes that 
are possibly very important, but peculiar to the context” (Carroll and Hannan, 2000: 
440).  Thus,  excessively  diversified  systems  tend  to  be  overspecialized.  Similarly, 
Kauffman  (1993)  suggested  that  evolution  manifest  itself  at  the  edge  of  chaos. 
Optimal diversity of a system falls between a dense homogeneity and a complete 
fragmentation. By the same token, Grabher and Stark (1997) argued that an excessive 
diversity  allows  the  development  of  a  biological  process  known  as 
compartmentalization. In a greatly diversified system, barriers emerge and buffer the 
various sub-populations from each other. The risk of this phenomenon is to suppress 
vital  selection  processes.  Thus,  while  great  diversity  constrains  system-level 
evolution,  it  reduces  the  ecological  competition  among  firms.  Therefore,  I 
hypothesize that: 
   7 
Hypothesis 2: There is an inverted È-shaped relationship between  
market diversity and organizational rate of failure. 
 
  Hypotheses 1 and 2 involve two different levels of analysis, the organization 
and the population. These two levels are analytically separated but obviously interact, 
with the another. Ecologists defined the diversity of products a firm offers in term of 
niche  width  (Hannan  and Carroll,  1995a).  Every  organization  in  fact  occupies  an 
organizational niche characterized by a set of capabilities (Baum and Singh, 1994b). 
They distinguish generalist from specialist organizations by the breadth of the niche 
they occupy. The latter, concentrate their fitness on a narrow space, and they do well 
when  the  environment  falls  within  that  space,  out-competing  generalists.  On  the 
contrary, generalists spread their fitness over a wider environmental space and do 
better  than  specialists  when  the  environment  is  uncertain.  Under  uncertain 
environmental conditions generalists will beat specialists organizations because they 
maintain the capacity to compete in several different environmental states, whereas 
specialists remain focused on a single state. In particular the theory maintains that 
generalists are favored when environmental variation is high and the pattern of this 
condition is coarse (Hannan and Freeman, 1977). Suarez and Utterback (1995) argued 
that organizations that enter the industry before the definition of a dominant design 
have the opportunity to experiment different solutions and, therefore, they are more 
likely to come up with the right solution. Dowell and Swaminathan (2000) found that 
the technological uncertainty of the early years of the United States bicycle industry 
favored  those  organizations  having  a  broad  product  line.  Usually,  diversified 
strategies are used in fields where uncertainty represents  a key variable: financial 
investments, gambling and energy policy (Sterling, 2000). In general, concepts like 
flexibility,  resilience,  robustness  and  modularity  emerged  as  a  response  to  the 
condition of ignorance. Under these conditions, no matter how great the resources, or 
how sophisticated the decision making processes, only fools put their eggs into one 
basket (Simpson, 1992).  
  Nevertheless, as noted by Sorenson (2000), environmental uncertainty is not 
only related to technology. Consumers for instance possess a set of heterogeneous   8 
preferences, and boundedly rational managers do not know ex ante the distribution of 
these preferences (March, 1978). Under these conditions, generalist firms benefit by 
locating products in that part of the resource space with unmet preferences. Yet, as 
product  diversity  increases  at  market  level,  the  set  of  preferences  of  customers 
becomes less uncertain. Growing market diversity helps in fact build legitimation and 
explore the tails of the resource space, opening up new niches that can be later filled 
by  the  more  efficient  specialist  organizations.  Similarly,  economics  models  of 
industrial  evolution  (Stigler,  1951)  suggest  that  vertical  disintegration  occurs  as 
market  expands.  Aldrich  and  Wiedenmayer  (1993:  171)  argued  that  “we  would 
expect specialists to emerge in populations after some early period of expansion.” 
Thus,  when  all  the  resource  space  is  legitimated  and  the  set  of  preferences  of 
customers  becomes  defined,  the  environment  looses  part  of  its  instability.  While 
changing  environments  favor  generalist  firms  because  they  fit  the  environment 
equally well, as volatility decreases, generalists become increasingly disadvantaged 
relative to specialist organizations.  
 
Hypothesis 3: As market diversity increases, the relationship between organizational 
diversification and rate of failure increases. 
 
  As  I  mentioned  before,  the  concept  of  organizational  niche  represents  a 
powerful tool to define intra-population differences in resource requirements. A large 
literature  in  organizational  ecology  demonstrated  how  competition,  and  therefore 
mortality, acts locally on some dimensions, with organizations more likely to compete 
with  one  another  the  more  they  overlap  on  one  of  these  dimensions.  McPherson 
(1983) defined niche overlap in terms of a common distribution of members across 
several  sociodemographic  characteristics.  He  argued  that  the  competition  between 
two  voluntary  organizations  for  members  is  proportional  to  their  similarities  on 
sociodemographic  characteristics.  In  another  study,  Baum  and  Singh  (1994b), 
measured the rate of disbanding of day care centers in Toronto between 1970 and 
1989, creating a measure of overlap focused on the similarities of these firms in age 
range  of  the  children  served.  Their  findings  showed  that  overlap  density  –  the   9 
aggregate overlap of an organization’s resource requirements with those of all others 
in the population – significantly raises the rate of disbanding. The same pattern was 
found when analyzing overlap on different characteristics: technology (Podolny et al., 
1996; Dobrev et al., 2001) and geography (Baum and Mezias, 1992; Sorenson and 
Audia,  2001;  Wezel  et  al.,  2001)  represent  the  most  investigated  dimensions.  In 
general, these pieces of research agree that the intensity of competition is a positive 
increasing function of the number of overlapping niches (Dobrev et al., 2001).  
  Nevertheless, at least two reasons exist to suppose the relationship between 
niche  overlap  and  competition  to  not  be  unidirectional.  First,  Simmel  (1950) 
suggested that the potential for cooperation among rivals increases when they interact 
in  multiple  domains,  since  each  will  gain  by  allowing  the  other  to  win  in  some 
domains  in  exchange  for  similar  treatment  in  other  domains.  Edwards  (1955) 
developed a similar idea in economics. In that work he noted that a multi-markets 
firm  has  an  incentive  to  refrain  from  competing  aggressively  in  the  sphere  of 
influence  of  its  multipoint  rivals,  as  long  as  its  own  sphere  is  respected.  Several 
studies found support for this hypothesis that firms mutually forbear when they meet 
in  multiple  markets  (Bernheim  and  Whinston,  1990;  Scott,  1991;  Barnett,  1993). 
Similarly,  Korn  and  Baum  (1999:  191),  analyzing  the  antecedents  of  multipoint 
contacts,  have  shown  that  “multimarket  contact  results  from  firms’  strategists’ 
recognizing that mutual benefits may result from encountering the same opponent in 
multiple markets.” Second, the overlap of strategies and resources among producers is 
an  important  feature  of  the  first  phases  of  the  development  of  an  industry.  As 
proposed  by  Kim,  Dobrev  and  Solari  (2001:  6-7)  “prior  to  the  burgeoning  of 
competition,  niche  overlap  represents  cooperative  rather  than  competitive 
relationship. Sharing positions in the market structure with others certainly turn two 
firms into head to head rivals, but it can also make them partners”. This insight is 
clearly implicit in the density-dependence formulation (Hannan, 1986). Within this 
theoretical  framework,  a  legitimate  organizational  form  means  that  organizations 
sharing the same resource space benefit from each other’s presence, because each 
contributes  to  the  legitimacy  of  the  market  space  they  collectively  occupy.  The 
creation  of  market  diversity  –  fundamental  to  differentiate  firms  and  to  reduce   10 
competition  among  them  -  is  a  process  of  exploration  of  new  niches.  It  requires 
investments  both  on  the  demand  and  on  the  supply  side.  Customers  need  to  be 
informed about the products through expositions and advertising. Suppliers need to be 
taught and guided, employees instructed in relation to the need of new production, the 
institutional  environment  needs  time  to  recognize  the  presence  of  these  new 
organizations (Carroll and Hannan, 2000). Collective movements – i.e. association of 
producers – can significantly help the promotion of products. The construction of 
market diversity represents an exploratory search of new products’ and customers’ 
niches.  The more organizations share this route, the less costly this search will be.  
  In  synthesis,  the  initial  phases  of  social  construction  of  the  industry  are 
usually uncertain and dominated by generalist producers. They meet each other in 
multiple segments of the market and, therefore tend to forbear. On the contrary, when 
the niches of products are fully explored, and the set of preferences of customers 
becomes clear, specialist organizations are attracted into the industry. At that time, 
specialist organizations - by definition single point competitors - reverse the benefits 
of mutual forbearance. Therefore, I hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 4: Increasing market diversity reverses the negative relationship between 
niche overlap and organizational rate of failure to positive. 
 
  The  hypotheses proposed  so far  suppose  a cyclical  pattern of  competition 
within  industries.  After  an  initial  confusion,  multi-point  organizations  prevail, 
building the environment until the customers’ set of preferences becomes established. 
At  that time, single-point competitors enter  the  market,  outperforming them.  This 
pattern is consistent with those studies that showed the tendency of stable industries 
to  be  disrupted  by  waves  of  new  foundings  (van  Duijn,  1983).  These  renewals 
represent  the  essence  of  the  process  of  selection.  How  does  selection  really  act? 
Technological  shifts,  for  instance,  are  supposed  to  generate  a  change  in  the 
demographic structure of the population through their tendency to destroy existing 
capabilities (Tushman and Anderson, 1986). In general, the variety of organizational 
forms  reflects  the  rise  and  fall  of  different  organizational  groups  in  response  to   11 
technological, political or institutional discontinuities (Delacroix and Carroll, 1983; 
Dobrev, 2001). All these processes rely on the idea that organizations are inert in 
reacting to environmental changes. In ecological models, however, inertia represents 
an  organizational  construct,  without  a  counterpart  at  the  population  level.  This 
argument  lead  Lomi,  Larsen  and  Freeman  (2001:  11)  to  conclude  that,  while 
organizations are subject to friction with any change, populations are mostly seen as 
adaptive. One of the most powerful forces of organizational inertia is age. The last 
findings in the ecological literature agree that organizational failure represent a built-
in phenomenon: mortality rates rise as organizations grow old (Barron, et al. 1994). 
As organizations age, the accumulation of rules, routines and structures impede their 
ability to compete. Obviously, when the age of the individual organizations increases, 
the average  age  of  the  whole  population  rises.  Assuming  that older organizations 
generate weaker competition (Barron et al., 1994), I hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 5a: There is a negative relationship between the average age  
of population’s members and organizational failure. 
 
  Therefore,  old  organizations  are  supposed  to  be  disadvantaged,  compared 
with younger ones, in changing environments (Carroll and Hannan, 2000: 290). This 
argument is consistent with an argument of organizational senescence: firms become 
unfit as they age. Following this rationale, the level of competition an organization 
faces  is  proportional  to  the  difference  between  its  age  and  that  of  the  other 
population’s members. Therefore, I hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 5b: There is a positive relationship between the heterogeneity  
of population’s members’ ages and organizational failure. 
 
  The density-dependence model assumes the population to reach a steady-state 
equilibrium (Baum, 1995). The main problem of this formulation of the theory is that 
it does not account for a wide variety of evolutionary trajectories observed in mature 
populations, particularly during the period of time that elapses after organizational   12 
density reaches its historical peak (Lomi et al., 2001). Several studies have in fact 
illustrated  patterns  of  sustained  oscillations  of  density  and  resurgence  during  the 
evolution of populations of organizations. Following the same theoretical rationale as 
hypotheses 5a and 5b, I would expect that oscillation in density in mature populations 
are related to the more than proportional effect of heterogeneity at increasing average 
ages. Therefore, I hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 5c: The positive relationship between the heterogeneity of population’s 
members’ ages and organizational failure increases with the average age of the 
population. 
 
  To summarize, I predicted firms to interact, one with the other, to develop the 
industry, promoting the survival of few efficient firms (H1-H3). Yet, the environment 





In  choosing  the  populations  for  this  research,  I  opted  for  the  European 
motorcycle industry for four main reasons. First, the nature of this industry, global but 
at the same time nationally heterogeneous represents an ideal field to test hypotheses 
of multi-level evolutionary processes. Second, data availability allowed me to collect 
observations at multiple levels of analysis, national and European. Third, the accurate 
records of vital events allowed me to avoid problems related to left truncation and to 
study the effects of density on the organizational founding and exit rates over the 
complete  history  of  the  population.  Last,  the  significant  body  of  research  on  the 
ecological dynamics of automobile organizations (Torres, 1995; Hannan et al., 1995; 
Hannan,  1997;  Hannan  et  al.,  1998;  Dobrev,  Kim  and  Hannan,  2001)  greatly 
facilitates comparison and accumulation of empirical results. 
The data used to build Figures 1 include 648 motorcycle producers in the 
United  Kingdom  in  the  period  between  1885  and  1993.  The  main  source  of   13 
information came from the book “British Motorcycles since 1900” (Collins, 1998) 
that includes the date of birth and disbanding of each firm in these countries. The year 
in which the first model appears was considered as the year of birth of a firm and the 
year  in  which  the  last  model  disappears  from  the  register  was  coded  as  death. 
Information were refined using the register of motorcycle production that contains a 
description of most of the models patented in the United Kingdom (Hume, 1991), as 
well as the text “Enciclopedia della Motocicletta” (Wilson, 1996). In order to test the 
reliability of the data, I checked the magazines of the period: Motor Age (from 1899), 
Cycle Trade Journal (from 1897), and Motor (from 1903) were consulted for this 
reason.  Finally,  I  cross-checked  all  the  information  crossing  them  with  other 
references: Erwin Tragatsch “The Complete Illustrate Encyclopedia of the World’s 
Motorcycles” (1977; 2000) considered the most reliable text for this industry, “A-Z of 
Motorcycle”  (Brown,  1997),  “Historic  Motorcycles”  (Burgess  Wise,  1973),  “The 
Ultimate  Motorcycle  Book”  (Wilson,  1993),  and  “Encyclopedia  of  Motorcycling” 
(Bishop and Barrington, 1995) confirmed the accuracy of data. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure1 about here 
------------------------------------------ 
 
Period Effects  
In order to avoid mispecifications
3, I left the entry and the exit rates freely 
change over historical periods in response to unmeasured environmental conditions. 
Nine dummy variables were created to define the main evolutionary periods of the 
motorcycle industry. These variables were set equal to one within the segment of 
observation and put equal to zero outside. Each effect measures the change in the rate 
                                                
3 “Organizational populations … sometimes spans centuries of time. In these cases, 
environments commonly develop and change in many dramatic ways. [I]t is often difficult to 
find systematic data that record environmental variables in reliable and consistent fashion 
across the entire period. [One option is to] periodize the history and seek to estimate period-
specific effects. Such periodization uses historical and institutional knowledge to identify 
periods where environmental conditions (of any kinds) are thought to differ significantly from 
each other” (Carroll and Hannan, 2000, p. 202).      14 
in comparison to the omitted category. The first periods were defined starting from 
the years of publication of the “Manuale Hoepli del Motociclista”, released in 1903, 
1909  and  1915.  The  objectivity  of  this  choice  is  guaranteed  by  the  fact  that  this 
publication had to be updated in the year in which the old edition was considered 
obsolete for the technology of the period. These periods mark the years of increasing 
international trade and economic growth allover Europe (Maddison, 1991). The years 
included between 1915 and 1918 are those of the First World War. After the WWI the 
economic climate changed and protectionism became a common trade policy. Exports 
declined dramatically. Yet, the enthusiasm around motorcycle production reached its 
apotheosis.  The  turn  of  1926  -  peak  of  density  in  many  countries  -  signed  the 
beginning of a new era defined as “new look”, during which the aesthetic design went 
side by side with the functionality of the products: motorcycles were designed using 
less angular shape, the rounded tanks begin to be diffused and the saddles become 
anatomical  (Tragatsch,  2000).  Indeed,  in  the  same  year,  the  United  Kingdom 
represented the first market in the world with 580.330 motorcycles on the road, and 
Europe was the core of the world automobile production (Hannan et al., 1995). 1939, 
marks the beginning of the Second World War. Last, 1958 indicates the symbolic 
year of start of the Japanese era and of the period of international free trade.  
 
Variables  
  I study the coevolution of organizations and environment as a matter of the 
interactions among three sets of variables: firms’ strategies, market diversity and age 
structure of the population. The dependent variable is represented by organizational 
failure. The main events associated with the ending of an organizational history were 
disbanding, exit to another industry, and merger or acquisition. For the first event, 
there is no ambiguity:  the  firm  failed  as  a  collective actor. Regarding  the  exit  to 
another industry, this suggests a lack of success. Mergers and acquisitions are more 
difficult to be interpreted. Both events indicate the end of at least one independent 
organization. Yet, given the ambiguous meaning of these events, I based my analysis 
only  on  disbanding  and  exit  to  other  industries.  The  most  challenging  issue  was 
related to the definition of those events considered as ‘unknown exits’. Following   15 
Hannan, Carroll, Dobrev and Han (1998), I believe these events to be governed by 
processes  very  similar  to  those  related  to  exits.  Therefore,  the  outcome  event  of 
interest  of  my  analysis is “disbanding/exit to another  industry,  defined  to  include 
events of unknown type” (Dobrev et al., 2001: 1311). Firms known to have ended by 
a  merger  or  an  acquisition  were  treated  as  right-censored  observation,  a  standard 
practice of event history analysis. 
   Carroll et al. (1996) noted that organizations can enter an industry following 
different paths. The more common ones are: i) a firm is founded de novo and has no 
prior experience at the time of entry, ii) a new firm results from a merger, or by the 
division  of  one  manufacturers  into  two  organizations,  or  iii)  a  firm  enters  from 
another industry. Previous researches on the American automobile industry found that 
the life chances of lateral entrants were higher than those that began de novo. Thus, I 
used  the  same  distinction,  building  three  dummy  variables  to  code  as  DeNovo 
inexperienced organizations, as DeAlio lateral entrants, and as DeIpso those firms 
entering through merger or resurgence of motorcycle manufacturers. To measure the 
relatedness  of  the  competencies  of  DeAlio  entrants  I  split  this  category  in  two 
dummies: MotoRelated and MotoUnrelated firms. The former includes manufacturers 
having  experience  in  bicycle,  car  or  engine  productions.  The  latter,  comes  from 
technologically unrelated productions, like armaments and sawing industries. The Age 
of  an  organization  was  measured  as  the  tenure  of  the  firm  in  the  industry. 
Unfortunatly, the archival sources I used contain only the year of the event. Thus, 
according to Petersen (1991), it was coded as occurring in the midpoint of the year. 
Those firms entering and exiting the same year received a tenure value of 0.5.  
Every  organization  in  a  population  occupies  an  organizational  niche 
characterized by a set of organizational capabilities and a location in resource space 
(Baum and Singh, 1994b: 350). Following previous studies (Podolny et al., 1996; 
Dobrev et al. 2001), I expressed the organization’s niche in a technological space. In 
particular, like Dobrev et al. (2001) did in their study of the automobile industry, I 
measured the niche width of a motorcycle producer as the spread of engine capacity 
over all models that a firm produces in each year, calculated in cubic centimeters (cc). 
Single product organization were set to have a niche equal to 1cc, to avoid speaking   16 
of  zero  niche  width.  Measuring  the  capabilities of an  organization  along  a  single 
dimension can be limited. Yet, this measure is typically used as a synthetic indicator 
of the complexity and sophistication of motorcycles. Thus, it represents a proxy of the 
organizational complexity a firm faces. Muffatto and Panizzolo (1996), for instance, 
in  one  of  the  few  longitudinal  study  of  the  motorcycle  industry,  used  the  same 
measure  to  differentiate  producers’  strategies.  Therefore,  to  measure  the  effect  of 
firm’s  diversification on  the failure rate,  I created  two variables  of  heterogeneity, 
called FirmDiversification and its squared term FirmDiversification
2. These variables 
were built as coefficients of variation of the range of the products, and indicate the 
yearly variance of the mean of the organization’s niche width. For instance, a firm 
selling two products, one of 350cc and the other of 500cc, is assumed to have a niche 
mean of 425cc, a standard deviation of 106.07cc and a FirmDiversification value of 
0.2496  (standard  deviation/mean).  A  rough  indicator  of  the  trend  of  firm’s 
performance  was  created  through  two  dummies  -  Expansion  or  Contraction  - 
controlling for the expansion or contraction of the niche width of at least one tenth of 
the range. I computed competitive intensity as relative to niche-overlap. Similarly to 
Barnett and McKendrick (2001), I defined competition among firms in proportion to 
their degree of overlapping production. For instance an organization i that produces 
125, 250 and 350cc motorcycles receives a value of 1/3 of competition from those 
firms overlapping on just one product – e.g. 125cc, and 1 from those having the same 
range of products. The measures were updated yearly.  
  The  coefficient  of  variation  I  used  to  create  the  measure  of  firm 
diversification  represents  a  natural  measure  of  heterogeneity,  widely  used  among 
demographers to predict  the effect of tenure variation on turnover rates  -  see the 
seminal work of (Pfeffer, 1983). As with the variable measured at firm level, I created 
a coefficient of variation of production at the industry level – MarketDiversity - to 
indicate the yearly level of market heterogeneity.
4 This variable was built making the 
ratio  of  market  mean  production  on  market  standard  deviation.  For  instance  in  a 
market with two organizations, one offering a range of 125 to 250cc and the other 250 
                                                
4 I measured market heterogeneity also using the Blau index. The findings obtained are 
qualitatively similar to those reported in the result section.   17 
to 350cc, the mean of the market is at 268.75, the standard deviation at 106.8 and the 




Insert Figure 2 about here 
------------------------------------------ 
  
To take into account the level of competition within the population, I defined 
density as the total number of motorcycle producers active in each year of observation 
– National Density. Nevertheless, the level of competition a firm faces is dependent 
on the age structure of the population. Barron, West and Hannan (1994) argued that 
firms become unfit as they age. Thus, as the mean age of the members of a population 
increases, the organizational failure rate is supposed to decrease. On the contrary, the 
effect of competition will be higher in a  population with a high heterogeneity in ages. 
Therefore, the mean and the standard deviation of ages of population’s members were 
taken  into  account  through  the  variables  PopulationMeanAge  and 
AgeStandardDeviation.  
More control variables were added to the analyses. The English motorcycle 
industry had its most important area in the triangle between Birmingham, Coventry 
and  Wolverhampton.  All  of  the  worldwide  Big  Six  famous  producers  apart  of 
Matchless - Ariel, BSA, (Royal) Enfield, Norton and Triumph - were located there. 
Within the range of a few squared kilometers almost one half (278 out of 648) of the 
whole  number  of  manufacturers  was  born  and  operated  there.  To  control  for  the 
potential  benefits  coming  from  knowledge  spillover,  I  created  a  dummy  variable, 
called District, to indicate those organizations having their headquarters in that area. 
Rao (1997) suggested that races are important for firms to demonstrate the reliability 
of their products. Competitions are especially important during the early years, to 
promote  the  social  construction  of  a  motor  industry  (Torres,  1995).    No  race  in 
England  was  more  important  than  the  Tourist  Trophy,  known  as  the  “Mecca  of 
motorcyclists” (Collins, 1998: 8). A yearly dummy, starting from the first edition of   18 
the race in 1907, was created to indicate which producer had won in at least one of 
the categories in competition.
5 As Henderson (1999) argued, firms using their own 
technology are subject to different risks than those using standard components. Not 
many  firms  produced  their  own  engine.  Most  of  them  used  the  Villiers,  Jap  and 
Minerva engines. To control for the potential different hazard for these organizations, 
I marked them as using OwnEngine with a dummy variable. Further, a clock named 
NationalIndustryAge  was  defined  to  control  for  trends  in  the  development  of  the 
population. This was calculated as the difference between 1895, the year in which the 
first producer entered the market, and the observed year. Last, two variables were 
included to indicate the fluctuation in the economic and political climate in Great 
Britain. The measure of Gross domestic product adjusted for inflation - GDP - was 
inserted,  using  data  from  Maddison  (1991).  A  dummy  variable  of  governmental 
instability – UnstableGoverment – takes the value of one during the years in which, 
neither the Conservative nor the Labour parties, possessed the majority of the seats in 
the English Parliament. 
 
Model and method of analysis  
For the analyses presented in the result section, I divided the life of each 
organization in organization-years through the spell-splitting technique (Tuma and 
Hannan, 1984). Again I used event history analysis. The final dataset includes the life 
of 648 firms divided into 4.685 year-segments. In general, different functions of time 
and different covariates can be used to model the hazard rate of each organization. 
Given  the  inconsistent  findings  on  parametric  formulation  of  the  rate  of  age-
dependence, a less restrictive way to model it has been recently suggested (Barron et 
al., 1994). For this reason, I chose to use a flexible model, the piecewise exponential, 
which allows the rate to vary in an unrestricted fashion from one interval to the other 
at pre-selected ages. The basic idea is simple. The age of an organization is divided 
into intervals and the hazard is constant within each interval but can vary across them. 
I defined a set of J intervals, dividing the age variable at precise points (a1, a2, a3, a4… 
                                                
5 The data were obtained from the following web page 
http//:www.iomtt.com/results/TTresults.asp   19 
aj), where a0 = 0 and aj = ￿. The interval J is given by [aj-1, aj) and the hazard for firm 
i is defined by:  
 





where aj = log mj. This formulation allows the intercept of the log-hazard 
function to vary at different cut points (Allison, 1995). The choice of the intervals was 
driven by the principle of equal number of observations for each category.
6  
To estimate the hazard rate (r) for organization i, I modeled it as a function of 
the firm’s age (a), industry age (t), a vector of firm’s characteristics (x), namely origin 
(DeIpso, DeNovo or DeAlio), location and two dummy variables controlling for the 
years of contraction or expansion of the firm’s niche, a vector of other covariates (v), 
including industry age, density, GDP, unstable government, and a function y(·) of 
firm diversification (linear and squared term), niche overlap, market variety (linear 
and squared term), and their interactions. Last, a function of age characteristics of the 
population, z(·), and their interaction completed the model: 
 
ri(a, t)  = mj(a) · exp(xia¢a a a a+vt¢b b b b)·y(Niche Overlapia, FirmDiversificationia, Market 
Diversityt)·z(MeanPopulationAget, AgeStandardDeviationt), 
[3] 
I estimated the models using the maximum likelihood estimation method as 
implemented in the software package STATA 6. 
 
 
                                                
6 According to this idea I divided the age of the firm in six segments: age1[0.5-2), age2[2-4), 
age3[4-6), age4[6-10), age5[10-17) age6[17-30) and age7[30-￿). 
i j x a r ' ) ( log 1 b a + =  20 
Results 
  Table 1 and 2 present the maximum likelihood estimates of the piecewise 
exponential model of failure rates for 648 motorcycle producers in United Kingdom 
during the period included between 1895 and 1993. In particular, Table 1 provides the 
test  for  hypotheses  1  to  3  about  the  interaction  of  firm  strategy  and  population 
diversity, whereas Table 2 investigates hypotheses 4, 5a, 5b, and 5c about the effects 
of market variety, niche overlap and age structure of the population on organizational 
exits.  
  Models 1 and 2 contain only control variables. The estimates of population-
level  and  national  controls  largely  confirm  the  expectations.  Those  related  to  the 
population – Industry age and Density – positively influence the exits. As the industry 
ages and the number of organizations within the population rise, failures increase. On 
the  contrary,  increasing  levels  of  GDP  reduced  the  probability  of  failure  of 
motorcycle  manufacturers.    At  the  firm  level,  winning  the  Tourist  Trophy  race, 
significantly help the producer to signal the quality  of its products. This result is 
consistent  with  the  findings  by  Rao  (1997)  about  the  United  States  automobile 
industry. As supposed, location matters in this industry. Organizations located in the 
district  included  between  Birmingham  Coventry  and  Wolverhampton  enjoyed  the 
well-known beneficial effects of co-location (Saxeninan, 1994). The hazard of failure 
for  these  firms  is  reduced  by  about  23%  [exp(-.257)]  in  comparison  to  the  other 
organizations  spread  all  over  Great  Britain.  Furthermore,  competition  not  only 




Insert Table 1 and 2 about here 
------------------------------------------ 
 
  At the mean value of overlapping production, the probability of failure for the 
focal firm increases by about 26% [exp(44.4*.0051)]. This finding seems to support 
the idea  that the  intra-population pattern of competition depends on the  extent  to   21 
which population members require similar resources, a fundamental principle of the 
size-localized theory. Last, two other control variables merit attention, namely the 
effect of prior experience, and the consequences of organizational expansion on the 
failure rates. First, consistently with the prediction of literature (Carroll et al., 1996), 
the effect of prior experience is negative and statistically significant on the exit rate 
(the  omitted  category  is  DeNovo).  These  beneficial  effects  are  one  third  more 
pronounced for DeIpso than for DeAlio firms.
7 Yet, as Model 2 suggests, the mean 
value  of  the  latter  hides  the  difference  existing  between  related  and  unrelated 
diversifications. Expertise in motor or vehicle related productions allow in fact for a 
greater  survival  advantage  in  comparison  to  those  unrelated.
8  Firms  having  this 
experience risk the failure almost half the time than De Novo organizations [exp(-
.602)]. Second, the health of a firm can be measured through its propensity to expand 
or contract the niche production. Strategic analysis actually builds on the assumption 
that firms grow, expand and increase profitability. On the contrary, a contraction of 
the range of products can indicate the beginning of a focalization strategy, induced by 
increasing competition. The direction of the estimates obtained for Expansion and 
Contraction variables is consistent with this prediction. Nonetheless, only the former 
presents a value statistically significant value.  
  Interestingly  enough,  adding  the  measures  of  market  variety  and  firm 
diversification in Model 3 reduce almost by half the value of the positive effect of 
expanding one’s range of production (-.2784 versus -.1503) and deprive statistical 
significance  of  the  estimate  of  the  impact  of  this  variable.  Clearly,  the  benefits 
coming from enlarging the production are related to the level of diversification of the 
firm, and to the diversity of the market. Yet, firms and population act in opposite 
ways. At the firm level, diversifying the production reduces the probability of failure 
                                                
7 This result, not according with the theory suggests the importance of trial by error 
learning within this industry. 
8 The survival advantage of unrelated firms of the reference category – even for the 
weakest of those analyzed - is not clear. One explanation can be related to their 
greater resource endowments. In an industry where the product is relatively easy to 
build (most of the manufacturers were bicycle producers), the allowance of financial   22 
– see Firm Diversification. The opposite happens at the population level: increasing 
market diversity rises the probability of failure – see Market Diversity. To understand 
how these two variables are related, I added an interaction term in Model 4. The 
positive  sign  of  the  coefficient  estimated  show  that  diversification  strategies  are 
penalized as market variety increases.  
To clarify this complex interaction, I graphed it in Figure 3. This figure plots 
the effect of firm diversification on failure rate and shows the multipliers at three 
different  levels  of  market  diversification:  the  mean,  the  mean  plus  one  standard 
deviation, and the mean minus one standard deviation. The plot demonstrates that 
firm diversification is a dangerous strategy as market diversity increases. When the 
impact of market diversity is .463 (m-s) the multiplier of the failure rate for a firm 
with  a  broad  range  of  products  (50-1000cc)  is  equal  to  3.58;  when  the  market 
diversity is .622 (m) the multiplier for the same firm is 5.56; and when the market 
diversity is .781 (m+s) the multiplier increases to 8.62. In general, a fully diversified 
firm risks failure three times more in 1948 (m+s) than in 1923 (m). These findings 
support hypothesis 3.  
 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 3 and 4 about here 
------------------------------------------ 
 
Nonetheless, this effect is not only related to market variety, but also to the 
intrinsic negative consequences of being greatly diversified. Managing a portfolio of 
multiple  products  is  linked  to  increasing  organizational  complexity.  Thus,  in 
hypothesis  1  I  supposed  that  the  relationship  between  firm  diversification  and 
organizational failure is not simply linearly negative. Model 5 adds the curvilinear 
effect of firm diversification – Firm Diversification
2 – to test it. The estimates of the 
linear  term  remain  negative,  while  the  estimate  of  the  quadratic  term  is  positive. 
Figure 4 illustrates the curvilinear relationship. The minimum of the function, and 
                                                                                                                           
resources destined for advertising and distribution could have been important in 
marking the survival difference between newly founded firms and those diversified.   23 
therefore the ideal level of organizational diversification for the organizations of this 
population,  is  equal  to  .69.  This  value  implies  for  instance,  that  a  firm  offering 
motorcycles ranging from 125cc and 350cc (diversification value .67) risks the failure 
almost half of the times than a single product organization.  
  To create the failure patterns shown in Figure 4 we would expect market 
diversity to act in the opposite way to organizational diversification. With hypothesis 
2, I proposed a high level of market heterogeneity to open up new niches, and to 
spread the resource space. The curvilinear relationship between market heterogeneity 
and firm failure is tested with the coefficient Market Diversity
2. Figure 5 plots the 
multiplier of the failure rate for this variable. The maximum of the function falls at 
the value of .76 of market diversity. This value was reached during the years around 
the Second World War – see Figure 2.  Since then, the positive effect of this variable 
on  the  exits  reverses  to  negative.  The  addition  of  the  curvilinear  effects  of  firm 
diversification and market variety significantly improves the fit of the model (c
2[L4￿ 
L2] = 6.9 with 2 d. f.).  
 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 5 and 6 about here 
------------------------------------------ 
 
  Therefore, we now know that the beneficial effects of even a modest firm 
diversification can be nullified by the uncertainty related to market diversity. On the 
one hand, organizations want to find new niches of customers, but on the other hand, 
a strategy of market exploration is risky. To offer the reader an example of these 
counterbalancing forces, I use the estimates obtained in Model 3. An organization that 
(at time t+1) adds 350cc motorcycle to its range of 125 and 250cc products risks 
about 12% less than the year before (time t). In a hypothetical population where (at 
time t) three firms exist, each producing 125 and 250cc, the change produced by 
expansion of the production (at time t+1) to 350cc increases the failure rate of the 
focal firm of about 68%. How can organizations overcome the risks related to the 
exploration of new markets? With hypothesis 4 I supposed that this is a problem of   24 
legitimacy and of collective effort needed to build the market. The intensity of the 
endeavor is supposed to be greater in a phase of low market diversity, and lower later. 
Thus, while in general resource overlap generates competition (see main effect of 
Niche Overlap), sharing a common product’s strategy assumes particular importance 
at  low levels  of  market  heterogeneity.  Model  6  tests  this  assumption through  the 
interaction terms between Niche Overlap, and the linear and squared term of Market 
Diversity. Even in this case, the addition of the two terms significantly increases the 
fit of the model (c
2[L6￿ L5] = 18.92 with 2 d. f.). The effect of niche overlap on the 
failure rate is moderated by market diversity: interactions between market diversity 
and niche overlap are negative for the linear term and positive for the quadratic term. 
As  before,  to illustrate  the  pattern  of  the interaction  terms  I  plotted  the  effect  of 
market diversity on the failure rate, measuring the multiplier at three different levels 
of  niche  overlap:  the  mean,  the  mean  plus  one  standard  deviation,  and  the  mean 
minus  one  standard  deviation.  Figure  6  shows  that,  as  the  market  becomes  more 
heterogeneous,  the  relationship  between  organizational  failure  and  niche  overlap 
reverses to positive. When the value of niche overlap is 17.23 (m-s) at the maximum 
level of market diversity the multiplier is equal to 1.24; when the value of niche 
overlap is 44.42 (m) and the multiplier of the failure rate is equal to 1.76; and when 
the niche overlap is 71.61 (m+s) the multiplier rises to 2.49. In general, while a high 
value  of  niche  overlap  strongly  reduce  the  failure  rate  at  a  low  level  of  market 
diversity, the opposite happens at a high level of market heterogeneity: in a highly 
diversified market, having low values of niche overlap represents the best strategy. 
This pattern of results support hypothesis 4. 
  Model 7 and 8 estimate the effects of age mean, standard deviation and their 
interaction on the exit rate of the firms of this population – H5a, H5b and H5c. The 
value  obtained  for  the  coefficient  of  Population  Mean  Age  and  Age  Standard 
Deviation support the hypotheses 5a and 5b (c
2[L7￿ L6] = 16.4 with 2 d. f.). The mean 
age has a significant negative effect on the mortality rate: as organizations age, they 
become weaker competitors. Each additional year in the mean age of competitors 
reduce  the  organizational  hazard  of  failure  by  about  7%.  Indeed,  population 
heterogeneity increases the probability of exits. A greater level of competition marks   25 
a population with organizations having different ages in comparison to a homogenous 
one. Last, the interaction coefficient of Model 8 (c
2[L8￿ L7] = 25.8 with 1 d. f.) tests 
the influence of the age heterogeneity in relation of different age values. In particular, 
as proposed by hypothesis 5c, the impact of the standard deviation is supposed to be 
higher at high levels of mean age than at low levels.  
  The effect of the interaction between the age’s standard deviation and the 
mean age - PopulationMeanAge·Age StandardDeviation - is positive and statistically 
significant. In other words, the effect of an increase in the standard deviation on the 
failure rate rises with the mean age of the population’s members. Figure 7 shows the 
relationship  between  ages’  standard  deviation  and  failure  rate,  as  the  industry’s 
members grow old. The vertical axis plots the multiplier of the base rate at the given 
combinations of mean age and standard deviation. The relationship is clearly steep, 
supporting hypothesis 5c. Finally, note that adding the interaction term in Model 8 
changes  the  effect  of  density  on  the  failure  rate:  its  estimate  looses  statistical 
significance.  Age  heterogeneity  mattered  more  than  density  for  the  disbanding  of 
these producers. Overall, the estimates displayed in Table 1 and 2 provide support for 
all the hypotheses proposed in the theory section. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 7 about here 
------------------------------------------ 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
  In  1994,  March  wrote  “[O]ne  of  the  more  important  post-Aristotelian 
developments in evolutionary theory is the emphasis on endogenous environments, on 
the ways in which the convergence between an evolving unit and its environment is 
complicated by the fact that the environment is not only changing but changing partly 
as a part of a process of coevolution… History cannot be seen as simply a product of 
the  organism  and  its  own  exogenous  environment.  Species  coevolve,  as  do 
institutions” (1994: 43). In this work I tried to address this issue using data on the   26 
vital  rates  of  648  motorcycle  producers  in  United  Kingdom  during  the  period 
included between 1895 and 1993.  
  The main findings of this work shed light on the interaction of three levels of 
analysis:  the  organization,  the  niches,  and  the  population.  Organizations  diversify 
their production in order to obtain economic advantages of scale and superior profits. 
Yet,  the  population  acts  in  the  opposite  way,  constraining  the  organizational 
expansion. The evolution of these two contrasting forces drives the coevolution of 
niches  of  generalist  and  specialist  producers  within  the  industry.  Last,  while  the 
increasing age of a population’s members tend to reduce the level of competition, 
ages’  heterogeneity  represents  a  powerful  selective  force  acting  within  an 
organizational population. 
  These  results  have  several  theoretical  and  empirical  implications.  First, 
literature on strategy repeatedly questioned whether diversification cause discount. 
Results from event studies about diversification do not offer a clear picture of the 
effect of this strategy on the profits and the economic value of the firm (Villalonga, 
2000). This study investigated a similar question at the level of diversification of the 
range of products. The answer I offer, is related to the ability of the firm to cope with 
multiple tasks. On average, the results of this research suggest that the ‘optimal’ level 
of diversification stand in the middle between tight focus and wide products’ range. 
Nevertheless,  a  complete  analysis  of  the  problem  needs  to  take  into  account  the 
competitive  dynamics  of  the  environment  where  the  firm  operates.  The  value  of 
diversification  depends  on  the  timing  of  industry  evolution,  on  fluctuations  in 
resource  flows,  and  on  the  distribution  of  the  demographic  composition  of  the 
members. In a market with few rivals, a diversification strategy outweighs the benefit 
of being focused. As the market gets crowded, the advantage reverses to those firms 
able to be more efficient. In general, increasing product variety at the population level 
reduces the positive consequences of a diversified production at the firm level.  
  Second, strategic management has in the past underlined the benefits related 
to  the  so-called  positional  advantage  that  organizations  isolated  from  competition 
enjoy.  Rumelt  (1984),  for  instance,  underlined  the  importance  of  isolating 
mechanisms  in  determining  the  success  of  a  firm.  Yet,  the  value  of  competitive   27 
isolation depends on the level of development of the population. During periods of 
market exploration, isolation deprives the organization of the engine of development. 
On the contrary, during these periods, competitive overlap helps build a collective 
effort that allows for the reduction of related costs. Nevertheless, these findings do 
not support the ‘Red Queen’ hypothesis (Barnett and Hansen, 1996). The relationship 
between competition and organizational failure is not simply negative – the more you 
compete, the stronger you are. And neither do they support a theory of organizational 
failure as a niche overlap phenomenon (Baum and Singh, 1994b). On the contrary, 
the findings of this study support the legitimation-competition model of evolution 
(Hannan, 1986). In particular, while many debates emerged about the completeness of 
the  concept  of  legitimacy  (Zucker,  1989;  Baum  and  Powell,  1995;  Hannan  and 
Carroll, 1995b) this work provides an alternative point of view to this issue. The 
number  of  organizations  within  an  industry  is  a  proxy  by  which  to  measure  the 
legitimation of an organizational form, but a more fine-grained variable to explain 
this concept is represented by the strategies pursued by the individual firms. The more 
they overlap, the faster the legitimation process. A similar proposition can clarify why 
industries exhibit different timing in reaching their historical peak of density.  
  Third, the density-dependence model (Hannan, 1986) assumes the population 
to  reach  a  steady-state  equilibrium  (Baum,  1995).  The  main  problem  of  this 
formulation of the theory is that it does not account for a wide variety of evolutionary 
trajectories observed in mature populations. A good example of these patterns can be 
found looking at the evolutionary trajectories of the European motorcycle industries. 
The  theoretical  explanations  used  to  account  for  these  phenomena  are  generally 
twofold: one that considers legitimation and competition as not proportional with time 
(Hannan, 1997), the other that justifies the late resurgence as a matter of resource 
partitioning (Carroll, 1985). The findings of this study about the effect of the mean 
and the heterogeneity of ages on organizational failure suggest another hypothesis. 
Mature organizational populations are typically marked by waves of foundings (van 
Duijn, 1983). Yet, late populations are typically characterized by a high mean age. 
The entrance of new producers in a similar environment increases the variability of 
ages of the industry. Following the rationale of the results proposed here, similar   28 
conditions correspond to elevated levels of competition – see Figure 7. Thus, this 
prevision can be used to explain why populations oscillate after reaching the peak in 
density. This hypothesis is in line with the positive correlation between entries and 
exits in mature industries found by Agarwal and Gort (1996). Potential implications 
of this proposition can also be related to the emerging theory of population inertia 
(Hannan, 1997). 
  Fourth, organizational and products’ diversity sets the limit on the range of 
alternative solutions that are available in the environment. Scant attention has been 
devoted to the systematic exploration of the nature and implications of diversity for 
the level of flexibility of an organizational population. Thus, at a normative level, 
policy  issues  are  somewhat  clearer.  Institutions  have  to  be  aware  that  product 
diversity represents a variable to determine the level of resilience of an industry to 
external shocks (Pimm, 1984). When Japanese producers entered the UK market in 
1960, the level of diversity was clearly in a phase of decline – see Figure 2. The 
competition of the Fifties helped to exploit the internal resources
9, but at the same 
time, it makes the diversity to progressively fall. Wezel (2001) demonstrates how this 
process  evolved.  This  alternative  view  to  the  classical  managerial  analysis  of  the 
United  Kingdom  motorcycle  industry  (Pascale,  1984)  alerts  policy-makers  to  be 
aware that diversity  plays a  central role for the  development and  maintenance of 
national industries. Further analyses are needed to shed light on this issue. 
Last, since the Sixties, important theoretical approaches were developed in 
the field of organizational studies: contingency theory (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967), 
resource dependence (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), population ecology (Hannan and 
Freeman, 1977) and new institutionalism (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Each of these 
theories  emphasized the relationship  between  organizations  and  environments.  All 
these theories assume that firms, through adaptation or selection, tend to assume an 
isomorphic  configuration with  the  environment.  As  a  consequence,  environmental 
changes are today studied in relation to exogenous shifts. Less frequently, we have 
investigated  how  organizations  can  mold  their  environments  and  how  the 
                                                
9 During those years the historical maximum level of penetration was reached, with 
almost .035 motorcycles per inhabitant.   29 
environment, composed of other firms, may influence in turn the same organizations. 
Organizations, in fact, can influence the availability of resources in a system. They 
can innovate and expand the resource space of a population. Indeed, organizations 
build  and  destroy  barriers  around  them.  The  development  of  digital  cameras  for 
instance determines the effacement of boundaries between classic camera producers – 
e.g. Nikon, Olympus - and computer firms. Thus, competition in moving landscapes 
represents today the norm, and not the exception, of organizational evolution. The 
findings illustrated in this paper confirm the importance of studying the evolution of a 
population  looking  at  different  levels  of  analysis.  Across  level  and  within  level 
evolutionary interactions represent an important and almost unexplored field of study 
in the organizational literature.   30 
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Table 1. Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Piecewise Exponential Model for 
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DeAlio  -.557** 
(.092) 




MotoRelated    -.602** 
(.1012) 
   
MotoUnrelated    -.426** 
(.133) 
   
         

























































FirmDiversificat·MarketDiversity        2.175* 
(1.318) 
Log Likelihood  2874.79  2875.22  2886.98  2887.99 
 
                                                
10 * p<.10; ** p<.05. Standard errors are in parentheses. Each model also includes market 
tenure and period effects.    42 
Table 1. Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Piecewise Exponential Model for 
Exits Rates of United Kingdom Motorcycle Producers 1895-1993
11. Controls. 
 
Variables  Model1  Model2  Model3  Model4 
























































































































Log Likelihood  2874.79  2875.22  2886.98  2887.99 
                                                
11 *p<.10; ** p<.05. Standard Errors  in parentheses. 
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Table 2. Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Piecewise Exponential Models 
for Exits Rates of United Kingdom Motorcycle Producers 1895-1993.
12 
 
Variables  Model5  Model6  Model7  Model8 


















































































































































































      .017** 
(.003) 
Log Likelihood  2891.44  2900.91  2909.17  2922.07 
                                                
12 * p<.10; ** p<.05. Standard errors are in parentheses. Each model also includes market 
tenure and period effects.    44 
Table 2. Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Piecewise Exponential Models for 
Exits Rates of United Kingdom Motorcycle Producers 1895-1993
13. Controls. 
 
Variables  Model5  Model6  Model7  Model8 
























































































































Log Likelihood  2891.44  290.91  2909.17  2922.07 
 
 
                                                
13 *p<.10; ** p<.05. Standard Errors  in parentheses. 
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1.2  46 
Figure 3. Multiplier of the failure rate for firm diversification, evaluated at three values 
of market diversity. 
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Figure 5. Multiplier of the failure rate for market diversity. 
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Figure 7. Relationship between mortality rate, mean age and standard deviation of population’s members.
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